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~ 1500 Elwood P. Dowd's Moral Claim 
Elwood P. Dowd keeps company with a giant rabbit who is 
invisible to other people, and that fact sets Elwood apart. But 
Elwood copes with life better than most of the people he deals 
with, and manifes tly better than the professional people who 
come into his life; on pragmatic grounds alone, Elwood makes 
a serious moral claim. In classical terms, he claims the virtues 
of friendship, p rudence, and magnanimity. 
This is about professional ethics in estate planning-about 
the morals, and the interesting moral questions , that come up 
in the lives of those who are paid to help other people work out 
the relationship between their things and the people they love, 
and to do that in reference to death. 1 I propose to match that 
agenda to the story of Elwood P. Dowd. I am arguing that the 
person to watch when you talk about ethics in the estate-plan-
ning practice is Elwood. I must first tell you who Elwood was; 
you will then remember him, if you don't already. He is much 
more important to us than Blackstone or Lord Coke. 
Elwood Dowd was a close friend of the title character in Mary 
Chase 's 1953 Pulitzer Prize play "Harvey. " 2 The title character 
in the play was a pooka who was seven feet tall. Pookas are 
rabbit-like creatures. Elwood met Harvey on the street one 
night. It was late. Each of them had been drinking. Harvey was 
leaning against a lamp-post at 18th and Fairfax. They became 
inseparable companions. 
It was not necessary for the producers of the play, or of the 
movie version of it, to employ an actor to be Harvey, since few 
in the cast and no one in the audience could see Harvey. T hat 
fact made it possible for Harvey to just be himself. Elwood P. 
Dowd was played by Jimmy Stewart in the movie, and by Art 
Carney on television. And it is Elwood, not Harvey, whom you 
want to watch when you talk about ethics in estate planning. 
In the third act, Harvey was also seen by Elwood's psychiatrist, 
Dr. Chumley. Dr. Chumley tried to woo Harvey away from his 
relationship with Elwood. Dr. Chumley wanted Harvey to take 
him to Akron, Ohio, for a vacation. It was necessary to his 
melancholy purpose for Dr. Chumley to woo Elwood, too, and 
in doing that he revealed to Elwood that Veta, Elwood's sis ter, 
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had been moving heaven and earth to get Elwood committed, 
involuntarily, to the doctor's sanitorium, Chumley's Rest. Veta 
had sound reasons: Elwood insisted on introducing Harvey to 
her friends, who could not see Harvey, and to all potential 
suitors for her daughter's hand. This led to social isolation for 
Veta and Myrtle Mae, and they apparently couldn't get comfort 
from going to bars with Elwood and Harvey. They could not 
escape Elwood entirely, either-even if they wanted to-be-
cause Elwood's and Veta's mother had given the family fortune 
to Elwood. 
Let me recall that scene for you. It is ethically significant: 
"Mr. Dowd," the doctor said, "None of those people are 
your friends. I am your friend." 
"And I'm yours ," said Elwood. 
"This sister of yours-she is at the bottom of this conspir-
acy against you. She's trying to persuade me to lock you up. 
Today she had commitment papers drawn up. She's got your 
power of attorney and the key to your safety box .... " 
To which Elwood replied: "My sister did all that in one 
afternoon? Veta is certainly a whirlwind." 
The doctor came to his feet, came around to the front of his 
desk, and said, "Haven't you any righteous indignation?" 
At that point, Elwood makes his ethical claim; please listen 
carefully: 
Dr. Chumley, my mother used to say to me, 'In this world, 
Elwood ... you must be oh, so smart or oh, so pleasant.' For 
years I was smart. I recommend pleasant. You may quote me." 
Elwood's ethic, being pleasant, was clear enough, I guess; but 
it was not simple. It brought him into considerable danger and 
- as any interesting ethic does-it caused suffering to other 
people. But, he said, being pleasant did more for him than being 
smart had done: It won him a host of friends; he introduced 
them to Harvey and invited them to come to his house for dinner 
with Veta, Myrtle Mae and himself. Being pleasant finally kept 
him from being committed to Chumley's Rest. It gave him peace 
and security: "I always have a wonderful time just where I am, 
whomever I'm with," he said. He should be the envy of account-
ants, bankers, and insurance underwriters . Even if you under-
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stand professional ethics as a system for staying out of trouble, 
as lawyers tend to do, rather than as a system for being a good 
person, Elwood's ethic was successful; it kept him out of trouble. 
The movie version of the story ended with Elwood walking into 
the sunset, away from Chumley's Rest. He had his arm around 
his tall friend, who had left Dr. Chumley inside the rest home. 
And Elwood said to Harvey, "I prefer you, too." 
Dr. Chumley did not have the consolations of Akron, after all, 
but only the consolations that all of us claim in professional life: 
"The function of a psychiatrist," he said-and we professionals 
all say this, I think-"is to tell the difference between those who 
are reasonable, and those who merely talk and act reasonably." 
The difference between Elwood and Dr. Chumley is that Elwood 
couldn't see a distinction between being reasonable and talking 
and acting reasonably. 
In classical ethics you would say that Elwood P. Dowd's was 
an ethic of virtues. 3 He claimed, as Aristotle did, the central 
importance of the virtue of friendship; he understood, as Aris-
totle did, that social institutions rest on that virtue and on the 
virtue of prudence, what Aristotle called practical wisdom.4 In 
order to function in his social institutions, Elwood also trained 
himself in the virtue of magnanimity-largeness of soul. 5 Judge 
Gaffney, who did the legal work on Elwood's commitment to 
Chumley's Rest, had known Elwood all of his life, and, the Judge 
said, "there was always something different about Elwood 
.... He was always so calm about any sudden change in plans. 
I used to admire it. I should have been suspicious. Take your 
average man looking up and seeing a big white rabbit. He'd do 
something about it. But not Elwood. He took that calmly, too." 
Which is to say that largeness of soul is not an easy virtue; you 
don't just get it; it's like jogging; you have to train for it.6 The 
average person probably doesn't have it. 
~ 1501 Those Who Dispute the Claim Talk About Getting 
the Job Done 
Elwood's ethic is repugnant to many people who are solemn 
about their work in the world. They argue with Elwood. They 
often find it necessary to get Elwood out of sight, or, better, 
to give him something that will cause him to see things as they 
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do: They do this in practice and as a matter of sound profes-
sional education. 
In the first act of the play, Dr. Sanderson, at Chumley's Rest, 
thinks that sister Veta is the crazy one. He has her captured and 
subjected to a warm bath. Veta thinks the people at Chumley's 
Rest are white slavers and directs her lawyer to sue them. Later 
Dr. Sanderson understands that Elwood is the crazy one, and he 
lets Veta out. He says, then, to Elwood, "The situation has 
changed since we met this afternoon. But I urge you to have no 
resentments. Dr. Chumley is your friend . He only wants to help 
you." 
Elwood said, "That's very nice of him. I would like to help 
him, too." 
Sanderson ignored that significant offer of help from Elwood 
-a point to which we must return-and said, "A cooperative 
attitude ... [is] half the battle. We all have to face reality, Dowd 
-sooner or later." 
Elwood replied, "Doctor, I wrestled with reality for forty 
years, and I am happy to state that I finally won out over it." 
Dr. Sanderson didn't hear that, either. Professionals don't 
listen when the question is a question about reality. They are 
always ready to bring in the big guns-to win early and to win 
big-when there's a standoff on a question about reality. This 
is mainline, professional stuff. When professionals get ready to 
act, they don't need help from their clients: as Nurse Kelly says 
of Dr. Chumley, "He is a psychiatrist with a national reputation. 
Whenever people have mental breakdowns they at once think of 
Dr. Chumley." 
In ethical terms, Dr. Sanderson is not interested in Elwood's 
claim to the virtues of friendship, prudence, and magnanimity. 
He is interested immediately in confining Elwood, so that he 
won't bother Veta and the Judge and Myrtle Mae, and then he 
is interested in giving Elwood a drug that will cause him to see 
the world realistically-no rabbit, no friends , no enjoyment in 
being where you are, no enjoyment in being with just anybody 
at all. Dr. Sanderson's patients don't see the world that way; they 
see it realistically. The ethical issue is clearly drawn in this scene. 
Dr. Sanderson claims that he understands reality; Elwood claims 
that he does, too, and that he has defeated reality. 
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The place I usually see this issue played out is, of course, in 
a law school, among those of us who claim to teach people how 
to serve clients who hope to save taxes and set up trusts and 
make their wills. Elwood's school of ethics concen trates on talk-
ing to such people. He would see clients as gifts rather than 
problems. He would tend to take the Internal Revenue Code 
with a sigh and a smile. He would maintain that appellate opin-
ions are evidences of professional failure. Dr . Sanderson's 
school would be more solemn about the Internal Revenue 
Code; it would teach from appellate opinions because it believes 
that judges are especially important. The Sanderson school of 
legal education would talk a lot about traps for the unwary, 
pitfalls, improvident heirs, and spendthrift clauses. The Sander-
son school of thought claims to face reality. 
In fact, the Sanderson school faces a reality that people in the 
Elwood school-for all their rabbits-don 't even see. T here was 
an example of this in the play: Myrtle Mae asked her mother why 
her grandmother left all of the family's money to Elwood. Veta 
said, "Well, I suppose it was because she died in his arms. 
People are sentimental about things like that. " 
Myrtle Mae said that answer didn't make sense. " She couldn' t 
make out her will after she died, could she?" Veta told her not 
to be didactic. " It's not becoming in a young girl, and men 
loathe it." 
That is a familiar example of a Sanderson-like exchange, of an 
exchange that that goes on frequently in law schools. It has two 
layers. In one layer the elder says to the younger that the 
younger doesn't know what she 's talking about. T his layer is 
important in professional ethics because it is how professionals 
learn to treat their clients. The lawyers law students know best 
are law professors. There aren ' t any clients around for these 
lawyers to react wi th , so the students take the place of clients in 
the professor's world; they are the professor's clients. Students 
watch how professors treat students; that's how they learn to 
treat their clients. Often this treatment is the way Veta treated 
Myrtle Mae. 
The other layer that is important here is a claim about what 
realism is. The persistent argument professionals have with El-
woodians is that friendship, prudence, and largeness of soul are 
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not realistic. Veta says that her mother favored Elwood in her 
will because Elwood was with her when she died. That would 
have to mean that, in this business of making wills, people some-
how survive themselves: wills and trusts are a way not to die. 
That, say the old to the young, is realism. For all of their roman-
tic softness, the Elwoodians never claim they know how not to 
die. Elwood said that Harvey could overcome time and space. 
He could stop the clock for you; "you can go away as long as you 
like with whomever you like and go as far as you like. And when 
you come back not one minute will have ticked by . . .. Einstein 
has overcome time and space. Harvey has overcome not only 
time and space-but any objections." But not even Harvey 
could overcome death. Only realis ts can do that. 
51 1502 The Issue, So Drawn, Is About Reality 
The issue is the reality of professional life in estate planning; 
the reality of client life in estate planning; and the reality of 
life in families that are affected by estate planning. If you 
carefully contemplate all of that reality, there is something to 
be said for pookas. 
51 1502.1 The Reality of Professional Life 
I think Dr. Sanderson has the ethical issue just right: we have 
to face reality. We Elwoodians concede that realism is the issue, 
and argue with the Sanderson party about what reali ty is. I 
suggest we do that in three steps: 
( 1) the reality of who helps whom; 
(2) the reality of who corrupts whom; and 
(3) the reality of who serves his own selfish needs and who 
doesn't. 
A. Who Helps Whom 
In the play, Elwood helped the doctors: He turned Dr . Chum-
ley's thoughts to a restful vacation, under a tree in Akron, with 
a pretty woman who would listen, and not talk, except to say to 
him, "Poor thing! Oh, you poor, poor thing." He got Dr. San-
derson to notice Nurse Kelly, and Nurse Kelly to get Dr. Sander-
son's attention. He got Judge Gaffney, the lawyer, to look for 
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Harvey. The lesson of the story is that the client helped the 
professionals, just as he said he would-and I believe that is 
usually the story with us professionals. That is realism. 
B. Who Corrupts Whom 
Some day, when you lawyers have an idle weekend afternoon, 
take the governing code of legal ethics for your jurisdiction-
you can find it on your book shelf, right next to the Bible-and 
do an experiment in ethics: cross out all of the parts that warn 
you not to be corrupted by your clients-the parts that talk 
about clients who expect you to keep their dirty secrets; clients 
who want you to be on their sidt! when it's not right; clients who 
want to cheat other people and lie to judges; clients who want 
to evade the imposition of justice, or of death, or of taxes. Cross 
those parts out; and see how much code you have left; see how 
much of our official ethic rests on the assumption that our really 
big moral problem in professional life is protecting ourselves 
from our vicious clients. I think you will conclude that our pro-
fessional tradition teaches us that clients corrupt lawyers. I'm 
sure the same thing is true in the accounting profession and in 
banking. I'm not so sure about insurance; insurance people are, 
on the whole, Elwoodians-more comfortable with being pleas-
ant than the rest of us are; and that means they see their clients 
as gifts rather than as threats'. 
C. Selfish Needs 
Now, take the part of the code that is left over from this 
experiment and notice how much of it has to do with our com-
fort, not our clients' comfort: the rules on confidentiality, with 
their exceptions for fee claims and charges against lawyers; the 
rules on conflict of interest, with their dependence on indepen-
dent professional judgment; the rules on fees, on lawyer collab-
oration, and on appearances of impropriety. We professionals 
serve our own needs, whatever else we do. This is an awful 
moral situation, because it means we deceive ourselves about 
whose needs we serve. I think of what Joseph Conrad said about 
the profession of espionage: "When our appointed activities 
seem by a lucky accident to obey the particular earnestness of 
our temperament ... we can taste the comfort of complete 
self-deception.' '7 
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Elwood set up against this professional self-deception a co-
herent, positive, classical ethic. He believed not only in having 
friends but in fostering friendship-in working at it, in making 
friendship a habit. A virtue, such as the virtue of friendship, is 
a skill. One has to learn it from someone, and then to practice 
it and keep it keen. This is true also oflargeness of soul; it often 
seems a matter of ordinary generosity. We tend to suppose that 
some people are born generous and some are not. Elwood was 
not born generous; he said he had tried being smart and recom-
mended being pleasant; he said he had wrestled with reality for 
forty years. I think he was generous because he had trained 
himself to be generous. And the same is true of Elwood's third 
virtue, prudence, or what Aristotle called practical wisdom. That 
virtue takes account of what is going on; prudent people look 
around; they are responsible-they are able to respond, without 
self-deception, to what is going on. 
Iris Murdoch, the British novelist and philosopher, says of 
realism as a moral argument: "At the level of serious common 
sense and of ordinary nonphilosophical reflection about the 
nature of morals it is perfectly obvious that goodness is con-
nected with knowledge ... with a refined and honest perception 
of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment and 
exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply 
of opening one's eyes but of a certain perfectly familiar kind of 
moral discipline. " 8 
Such a consideration of the virtue of prudence gets us back 
to the main moral argument here, which is whether the profes-
sional school of ethics that Dr. Sanderson proclaims is more in 
tune with reality than the Elwoodians are. I have argued that our 
professional ethics deceive us into supposing we serve clients 
more than they serve us, so that when we are being most selfish, 
we are able to tell ourselves that we are serving not ourselves 
but our clients. 
' 1502.2 The Reality of What Estate Planning Does for 
People 
The second agenda for this examination of reality that Dr. 
Sanderson's school of ethics demands asks us what we do for our 
clients. The Elwoodians' claim is that we do for them what a Diet 
' 1502.2 1985 INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 15-10 
Coke does for them: we make them feel better. Without calories. 
That's what we "estate planners" have to offer. Dead people 
don't pay taxes; if they did we wouldn't have a $200 billion 
annual federal deficit. Dead people don't take it with them, or 
even come back to visit it. Elwood's mother is long gone. She 
had to leave it all behind, and now it belongs to somebody else. 
Whatever Mother Dowd's motives were for leaving the family 
fortune to Elwood, they did not, as the realistic Veta supposed, 
include gratitude for the fact that Elwood was with her when she 
died. But her motives might have included the fact that she knew 
he would be with her when she died; that thought may have made 
her feel better. Professionals of Elwood's school would say that 
it's realistic to feel better when you believe that you need not die 
alone. I suspect that is part of what Elwood meant when he said 
that he had won out over reality. 
The Elwoodian argument on the question of what we do is, 
first, an argument about reality: that is, the professional task we 
are paid to see to is making people feel better. And, then, sec-
ond, Elwoodians say we can live with that. First: the dominant 
facts in estate planning are facts about feelings. And, second: 
service to feelings is worthwhile: 
"The faces of the other people turn toward mine and smile," 
Elwood says. "Harvey and I warm ourselves in all these golden 
moments. We have entered as strangers-soon we have friends . 
. . . They talk to us. They tell about the big terrible things they 
have done. The big wonderful things they will do. Their hopes, 
their regrets, their loves, their hates. All very large because 
nobody ever brings anything small into a bar .... When they 
leave, they leave impressed .... " Elwoodians believe that such 
a role in the community is worthwhile. But, most of all , and 
before any argument about what's worthwhile, Elwoodian estate 
planners say: that is what we do. 
If that is what we do, and if it is worthwhile-either or both 
-the result in terms of professional skill will be that we learn 
more about what we do. What we do concerns feelings, and 
especially feelings toward death, toward things, toward those 
our clients love. You don't get a lot of learning on those things 
from appellate opinions. Consider some random social-science 
information that will come to light for those who make learning 
about feelings important:9 
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-.:..Most Americans think it is immoral to disinherit a child. 
-At least a third of Americans think it is immoral even to 
give children unequal shares. 
-It is likely that most married people think it is immoral to 
leave property to children when the spouse also survives. 
Those are findings about morals; they run deep. I would say this: 
If you don't occasionally find your clients in tears over these 
issues-something's the matter with the way you do things; 
you're not being realistic! These findings result in decisions 
made in our offices, and they are stressful, particularly when the 
circumstances argue for resisting moral notions. The prevailing 
professional attitude is that the decisions are the client's, that 
the professional should remain detached from the emotional 
crisis-but we Elwoodians question that attitude. Why be de-
tached? Would it make a difference to the prevailing profes-
sional attitude if we remembered that the only thing the client 
gets is that he gets to feel better? Would it make a difference if 
we remembered that professionals usually run their lives to 
serve their own needs? 
In any case, Elwood's example is clear; what interested him 
was other people-what they felt, where they hurt, what they 
wanted to do. And he was happy to accept similar concern from 
the people he dealt with . What did not interest him was an 
abstract issue that did not involve either the other person's 
feelings, or Elwood's: he would not have been fascinated by 
appellate opinions or the Internal Revenue Code. Early in the 
play, when Nurse Kelly was trying to put him at ease in the 
office, she offered him a magazine to look at. "I would much 
rather look at you, Miss Kelly, if you don't mind," Elwood said. 
She tried again with ventilation. "Dr. Sanderson wants to know 
if he should open a window," she said. Elwood said, "That's 
entirely up to him. I wouldn't presume to live his life for him." 
In Elwood's and Veta's story-and it was a story about them 
-the feelings they have for one another resolve the plot. Feel-
ings are decisive. The feelings of persons in families are decisive 
in the stories we "estate planners" get to share in. Elwood first 
met Harvey after his mother died, when Veta and Myrtle Mae 
came from Des Moines to live with him. It is not clear whether 
Harvey came to Elwood in an emotional crisis, or whether, if that 
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is why Harvey came, the emotional crisis followed the death of 
Elwood's mother or the addition of Veta and Myrtle Mae to his 
daily life. But it is clear that Veta and Elwood loved one another. 
Because Elwood loved Veta he offered to take Dr. Chumley's 
serum, even though the result would have been Harvey's disap-
pearance and a normal human life-"no fun-and no tips" as 
Elwood's taxi driver put it. (Elwood knew all along, I think, what 
Veta was up to.) 
And because Veta loves Elwood, she stops the injection; she 
decides to live with Harvey after all, and to put up with Elwood, 
even though he "is the biggest heartache I have. Even if people 
do call him peculiar," she says, "he's still my brother." The truth 
about brothers and sisters is a fact; it is a reality; it is so impor-
tant for all of us that our professional lives would be barren 
without it. 
~ 1503 Conclusion 
The tough, no doubt, have something to teach the tender; but 
Elwood's story is a reminder of the fact that the tender have 
something to teach the tough-something about reality. 
The people in Elwood's story go around and around over the 
question of whether Harvey is real. The audience never gets to 
see Harvey. At least I never have, and I've seen the play on the 
stage and on television. I've seen the movie eight times. I've 
come to the point where I'm not sure but what Harvey's there. 
I remember when I saw Jimmy Stewart play Elwood on the stage 
in London. At the curtain call, they used the Chumley's Rest 
scene without a curtain; there was a set of swinging double doors 
at rear center stage. Mr. Stewart took his bow, then stepped 
aside and bowed to the doors; they swung slowly open, and 
Harvey took his bow. Perhaps the British saw him; I hope so. 
But, finally, that question about Harvey never gets answered. 
What the tough have to teach the tender about Harvey, what 
Veta has to teach all of us-is that the possibility of Harvey is 
more important than the question about Harvey. When she and 
Myrtle Mae were talking about the injection, and the disappear-
ance of Harvey from Elwood's life, Veta said, "Harvey always 
follows Elwood home .... If you give him the formula and 
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Elwood doesn't see Harvey, he won't let him in. Then when he 
comes to the door, I'll deal with him." 
Myrtle Mae said, "Mother, won't you stop talking about Har-
vey as if there was such a thing." 
And Veta said, "Myrtle Mae, you've got a lot to learn and I 
hope you never learn it." 
What the tender have to teach the tough is what Dr. Chumley 
learned at the peak of his successful professional life. Myrtle 
Mae told the doctor that Elwood could predict the future. 
"Things always turn out the way Uncle Elwood says they will," 
she said. "Harvey knows everything." And Chumley is con-
verted; in a moment he becomes an Elwoodian. "Fly specks," he 
said. "I've been spending my life among fly-specks while mira-
cles have been leaning on lamp-posts." 
* * * 
Elwood P. Dowd argues for the possibilities, in professional 
life, of friendship, of practical wisdom, and of largeness of soul. 
Harvey and I hope these arguments have been of some momen-
tary interest to you. In any case, we leave you, as Elwood left 
Mrs. Chumley, saying, "Regards to you and anybody else you 
happen to run into." 
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